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What Does Philosophy Have to Offer Education, and Who Should Be Offering It?
Stanton Wortham
Graduate School of Education
University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT. In this review essay Stanton Wortham explores how philosophy of education
should both turn inward, engaging with concepts and arguments developed in academic
philosophy, and outward, encouraging educational publics to apply philosophical
approaches to educational policy and practice. He develops this argument with
reference to two recent ambitious projects: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education,
edited by Harvey Siegel, and the two-volume yearbook of the National
Society for the Study of Education (NSSE), titled Why Do We Educate? edited by Gary
Fenstermacher (series editor), David Coulter and John Wiens (volume 1), and Mark
Smylie (volume 2). These two projects initially appear to be opposed, with the Handbook
emphasizing elite philosophy and the Yearbook emphasizing public engagement.
Wortham argues that each project is in fact more complex, and that they are in some
respects complementary. He concludes by making a case against a simple hierarchy of
basic and applied knowledge and calling for a more heterogeneous philosophy of
education.

The works under review in this essay — the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Education, edited by Harvey Siegel, and the National Society for the Study of Education’s
two-volume yearbook, Why Do We Educate? edited by Gary Fenstermacher — present a
broad range of work in the field of philosophy of education.1 Each of these substantial
projects hopes to reposition the field. The twenty-eight-chapter Handbook is
comprehensive, with sections on aims, reasoning, ethics, knowledge, and politics. About
two-thirds of the authors are what Siegel calls “general philosophers,” who work “in
departments of philosophy and publish … in mainstream philosophy journals” (OPE, 4),
and most of the rest are well-known philosophers of education. All of the authors
contributing to this volume avoid or explain technical terminology, and the chapters in
this collection are thus clearly written and mostly compelling. The Handbook will be of
interest to many general philosophers and to almost all philosophers of education, as
well as to scholars in education who are comfortable with theory. Like most serious
philosophical work, it will probably not appeal broadly to educational researchers,
policymakers, practitioners, or the general public. The two-volume NSSE Yearbook, on
the other hand, is aimed directly at these four groups. About half of the twenty-one
chapters in the first volume are written by philosophers of education, a few are written
by general philosophers, and the rest are written by educational researchers. The
chapters introduce philosophical questions about the purposes of education and connect
these to educational policy and practice. The first volume will be useful to philosophers
of education and of interest to academically inclined practitioners, policymakers, and
citizens. The second volume contains about 100 short pieces or excerpts ! mostly in
nonacademic genres ! from a range of artists, entertainers, businesspeople, scientists,
educators, politicians, clergy, journalists, and scholars. These selections raise interesting
questions about the ends of education and take various positions. This volume will
interest anyone who wants to be provoked by and to reflect on heterogeneous claims
about educational purposes.
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Philosophy of education, as Siegel defines it, “is that branch of philosophy that
addresses philosophical questions concerning the nature, aims and problems of
education.… [It] look[s] both inward to the parent discipline of philosophy and outward
to educational practice” (OPE, 3). This distinction can be applied to the books under
review here, as well: The Handbook looks inward, while the Yearbook looks outward.
Siegel notes that many of the most important general philosophers from Plato through
the middle of the twentieth century wrote about topics in the philosophy of education as
part of their broader philosophical work, but he claims that philosophy of education has
in recent decades been “abandoned” by general philosophers for “contingent historical”
reasons — which he unfortunately does not elaborate, because it would be useful to
understand the abandonment. Siegel notes that this deprives philosophy of education of
talented potential contributors and, I would add, hurts its standing within the academy.
The Handbook’s primary goal is
restoration of philosophy of education to its rightful place in the world of general
philosophy, by playing some role in furthering the recent rekindling of interest
among general philosophers in philosophy of education: in their taking seriously
philosophical problems concerning education, and in putting the latter on their
philosophical agendas. (OPE, 7)
The Handbook, then, looks inward toward the “parent” discipline of philosophy, trying
to garner attention and respect from general philosophers and trying to enlist them in
studying educational issues. In contrast, the Yearbook looks outward, trying to catalyze
public conversations about the ends of education. The series editor Gary Fenstermacher
and his fellow volume editors argue that “too many public discussions of education are
dominated by too few ideas” (RC, 1) and that we need a more “robust, inclusive and
incisive conversation about education and schooling” (VC, 2). The first volume is
“designed to aid persons to contribute to the conversation” (RC, 2) by modeling more
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philosophically informed discussion about the ends of education. The second volume
presents pieces in the ongoing conversation that is already taking place, both
demonstrating that interesting claims about the aims of education are being made and
providing points of entry for readers to join that conversation.
It appears, then, that the two projects offer different answers to the questions in
my title. The Handbook argues that general philosophers have professional expertise that
can be productively applied to educational topics and phenomena. The results will
include insights and arguments that may be of use to educational researchers,
practitioners, policymakers, and the public ! perhaps in the same way as the results of
basic scientific research are often useful in the long run ! but professionals should work
through the substantive issues before engaging nonphilosophers about possible
applications. The Yearbook argues that philosophers of education should use what they
already know to engage educational researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and the
public in richer conversations about the ends of education. This seems at first glance to
stand in opposition to the approach of the Handbook: instead of turning inward toward
the discipline of philosophy, philosophers of education should be turning outward
toward educational stakeholders; instead of focusing on the elite group of general
philosophers, the Yearbook hopes to deepen an ongoing popular conversation about
education. On the other hand, one might argue that the two projects are not opposed but
complementary. What exactly is the Yearbook bringing to the broader public
conversation about education? Perhaps it is contributing knowledge and techniques that
have been developed by general philosophers in professional publications such as the
Handbook. This essay explores whether the two projects are opposed or complementary.
In the first two sections I argue that neither project is as univocal as it initially seems,
and I suggest that philosophy of education should turn both inward and outward. In the
final section I argue for a heterogeneous philosophy of education.
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Turning Toward the Academy
In his introduction to the Handbook, Siegel argues that “the pursuit of
philosophical questions concerning education is partly dependent upon investigations
of the more familiar core areas of philosophy” (OPE, 4). He also uses the term “depend
on” when illustrating what he means by this ! for example, questions about curriculum
depend on general philosophical issues explored in epistemology and questions of
learning depend on investigations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. He does
add adverbs such as “routinely,” “typically,” or “often” to these claims, so it would take
further investigation to determine precisely what Siegel means by “dependence” here.
But the metaphor of general philosophy as “core” also implies that investigations in the
philosophy of education must draw on concepts, arguments, and insights from general
philosophy, while the reverse is not true. The Handbook appears to set up a hierarchical
relation between general philosophy and philosophy of education. In what follows I
explore where the chapters in the Handbook stand with respect to this apparently
hierarchical relation. Only a few offer explicit arguments on the topic, but all of the
chapters position themselves and their intended audiences in relevant ways.
Handbook authors do three types of positioning on this issue. About a quarter of
the chapters (spread across the various sections) describe contemporary work on a topic
in general philosophy, then explain how this can illuminate issues of concern to
philosophers of education, educational researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.
These chapters presuppose that general philosophy forms a “core” that can be applied to
educational topics. Many of these chapters are useful, explaining contemporary
philosophical insights and describing interesting applications. Emily Robertson explores
how knowledge can be warranted despite the fact that knowers are always
sociopolitically located. She applies established distinctions and arguments from general
philosophy and provides insight for those who study how education helps students
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develop warranted knowledge. Richard Feldman defines the key aspects of arguments
and explores how one might teach students to appreciate and critique them better. Like
Robertson’s, his chapter is not intended to make original contributions to general
philosophy itself. In fact, he argues that important issues “sometimes get lost in the
[general] philosophical debates about the nature and goals of argument” (OPE, 68). The
Handbook provides Feldman an opportunity to step back and look at the fundamentals,
presumably because those in education need a less technical overview. His chapter
contains philosophical arguments in which he makes useful distinctions and provides
systematic support for claims, but he does this in the service of explaining established
terrain to outsiders. Writing in a similar way about another domain, Michael Slote
reviews arguments that justice should be conceptualized in terms of care and relation
instead of decontextualized autonomy. He cites arguments from general philosophy and
elaborates their implications for education. Other chapters also bring concepts and
arguments from general philosophy to bear on educational issues. Robert Audi applies
philosophical theories to the question of how science educators can be neutral toward
religion; Richard Grandy draws on epistemology and philosophy of science to explore
whether teachers should emphasize established scientific theories or explore students’
own conceptions of nature; and Lawrence Blum develops a philosophical account of
prejudice in order to explore how one might educate against it. All of these chapters
offer clear reviews of general philosophical work and demonstrate its relevance to
education.
Almost half of the Handbook authors position themselves in a different way: they
develop arguments about topics in the philosophy of education, without presupposing
that general philosophy has something in particular to add. Some of these authors are
general philosophers and others are philosophers of education. All employ concepts and
ways of thinking that are recognizably philosophical ! they carefully examine
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alternative positions, diligently look for tacit assumptions, and systematically attend to
grounds for belief — and almost all draw on work in general philosophy. Eamonn
Callan and Dylan Arena address the question of whether, if the ends are worthy,
indoctrination is justifiable. They argue that the creation of closed-mindedness, even in
the service of indoctrinating young people into true belief, is inappropriate. Rob Reich
argues that children themselves should have more say in how they are educated, and he
describes tensions between the legitimate educational interests of parents, children, and
the state. Harry Brighouse outlines the primary aims of education and shows the
difficulty of adjudicating conflicts among them. Meira Levinson carefully describes ten
goals that underlie “multicultural education” and outlines incompatibilities among
mutually exclusive versions. Amy Gutmann argues for a particular version of
multicultural education, one that creates “equal citizenship,” mutual toleration, and
appropriate recognition of groups. Both Catherine Elgin and Martha Nussbaum argue
for the importance of the arts and humanities in a society increasingly concerned with
technical expertise and rapid returns from education. All these chapters, and several
others, draw on work in general philosophy as well as work in the philosophy of
education to develop well-reasoned arguments about important educational issues.
The remaining quarter of the Handbook chapters show how questions in the
philosophy of education play a crucial role in general philosophy. These chapters
undermine the alleged hierarchy, claiming that philosophy of education is “intertwined”
with general philosophy and that some educational issues are so “deep” that
investigation of them is required to answer general philosophical questions. Several
chapters in this group are among the most provocative in the volume. Stefaan Cuypers
claims explicitly that there are “essential,” “intrinsic” connections between general
philosophy and the philosophy of education. He argues that general philosophical
accounts of free will must explore “education for authenticity,” the process through
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which autonomous wills emerge in nondeterministic, noncoercive education. Philip
Kitcher also argues explicitly that key issues in general philosophy depend on
philosophy of education. He illustrates this with an argument about tensions between
liberal educational ideals and the demands of an economic system that presupposes an
alternative vision of human flourishing. Amelie Rorty argues that imaginative thinking
is essential to practical rationality, and she explores whether and how this can be taught.
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith analyze a type of teaching central to general
philosophy, Socratic teaching. Elijah Millgram explores moral education in order to
develop an argument about the dependence of moral standards on moral communities
and the shifts in moral communities over time.
There is no conceptual conflict between the three types of positioning done by
Handbook authors, and one could argue that some chapters adopt more than one
position. Several chapters in the first group show convincingly that philosophers of
education and educational researchers could benefit from ideas and approaches
developed in general philosophy. At the same time, as illustrated in the second group,
philosophers from whatever subfield can and should continue to do systematic work
exploring educational questions. Neither of these approaches contradicts the claim made
by the third group of authors, that some core issues in general philosophy require
engagement with educational questions. Siegel himself agrees that all three approaches
are valuable. He laments the separation between general philosophy and philosophy of
education, and he envisions mutually beneficial interconnections between the two fields.
He does want general philosophers to have more interest in and influence over the
philosophy of education. But he also argues that “the pursuit of fundamental questions
in more or less all the core areas of philosophy often leads naturally to and is sometimes
enhanced by sustained attention to questions about education” (OPE, 5) and that
educational questions are “intertwined” with many general philosophical issues. This
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envisions general philosophy as an enterprise essentially engaged with educational
questions because it cannot answer core questions about knowledge, ethics, and sociality
without addressing how humans do and should develop cognitively, ethically, and
socially ! and these developmental processes cannot be elucidated without examining
education in a broad sense. The Handbook thus offers two answers to the question of how
general philosophy should relate to philosophy of education: one assumes a hierarchy
between the two, with “core” knowledge from the “parent discipline” moving only in
one direction, downstream to the applied field, while the other envisions a more
complex mutual dependence that enriches both. General philosophers have important
knowledge and practices to offer philosophers of education, educational researchers,
policymakers, practitioners, and the public, but the discipline can also benefit from
engaging with educational topics and perhaps educational practices.
Turning Toward Educational Publics
The two-volume NSSE Yearbook turns outward, hoping to engage educational
researchers, policymakers, practitioners, and the public in conversation about the ends
of education. But what kind of public conversation do the volumes envision, and what
do philosophers have to contribute? The titles for the two volumes begin the same way
! Why Do We Educate? ! but end differently. The first volume, which has a “more
traditional scholarly character” (Fenstermacher in VC, 3), is titled Renewing the
Conversation, while the second is called Voices from the Conversation. The editors imagine
different tasks for the two volumes and a different status for the authors in each. The
first volume, edited by David Coulter and John Wiens, has the potential to influence the
public conversation about the ends of education, while the second, edited by Mark
Smylie, presents excerpts from that conversation as it exists. As Fenstermacher, the
series editor, says, the first “volume is intended to advance” the conversation while the
second merely “samples” it (VC, 3). The first volume is intended to act upon the reader
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- it is “designed to aid persons to contribute to the conversation” (Fenstermacher in RC,
2) - while the second volume does not have this capacity. The editors hope that
readers, having been prepared by the first volume to participate in a philosophically
invigorated public conversation about the ends of education, will interact more
effectively with voices such as those presented in the second volume.
This section explores what the editors mean by “the conversation” - who is
talking, about what, following what norms, and for what purposes. The volumes’
explicit and tacit answers to these questions reveal how they think the philosophy of
education can and should shape public discussions of educational policy and practice.
To begin addressing the questions, we should explore why the editors feel that
conversation about educational ends needs renewal. Smylie, editor of the second
volume, claims that “our society faces unforeseen changes and unprecedented
challenges” (VC, 7) and that we have lost “anchoring principles.” Fenstermacher argues
that current public discussions of education are narrow and of low quality and that we
need a more “robust, inclusive and incisive conversation about education and
schooling” (VC, 2). While it is true that contemporary discussions of educational policy
too often focus on raising test scores and increasing economic competitiveness, to the
exclusion of other educational ends, the editors do not argue convincingly that “the
conversation” needs to be renewed now more than in other times and places. In many
historical eras Americans have felt that some problem needed urgently to be solved
(such as incorporating former slaves into social and political life, assimilating
immigrants, or defeating Communism), that education was crucial to solving this
problem, and that the educational apparatus was failing to act as it should. Voices from
the Conversation contains a 1963 essay by James Baldwin in which he argued that “we are
living through a very dangerous time” and that education is the key to navigating it
successfully (VC, 17). That volume also contains an essay by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi
in which he pointed out that “public opinion in almost every country is dissatisfied
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with the prevailing system of education” (VC, 228). Serious dissatisfaction with
education occurs in many times and places. I am sympathetic to the editors’ belief
that public discussions of educational ends should be made broader and deeper, but
I am convinced neither that we face unprecedented educational challenges at this
sociohistorical moment nor that public discussions of education have degenerated to
unusually low levels.
Optimists among us might argue that the editors and others concerned about
improving public discussions of education have an unusual opportunity at this
sociohistorical moment, however. Three U.S. Presidents in a row have treated education
as a crucial aspect of government policy, and the public has also shown interest in
education. The volume editors are correct that the resulting discussions of education
have been narrower than most philosophers would like, but this is nonetheless a
moment at which philosophically informed discussions of educational ends could
perhaps influence public policy - if philosophers could somehow help educational
publics reflect in a more philosophically informed way. The prospects for this have
increased recently because of a shift in higher education away from an exclusive focus
on decontextualized research as the core mission of the university and toward practical
engagement with the world. University administrators and faculty in the arts and
sciences are increasingly reaching out to colleagues in education and related areas,
hoping to include practical or service content in their courses, to build partnerships with
communities, and to focus their work in part on improving education, public health, and
social welfare. Although the editors do not frame it this way, their project aligns with
the argument that we should try to deepen public conversations about education at a
time when such conversations are more likely to have an impact.

11

The first volume is intended to spark a renewed conversation. The volume
contains twenty-one essays, about half of which are authored by scholars well-known to
philosophers of education, including Kwame Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, Harry
Brighouse, Eamonn Callan, Kieran Egan, Gary Fenstermacher, Nel Noddings, Martha
Nussbaum, and Diane Ravitch. Several chapters from other authors are also compelling
— notably an essay on divergent conceptions of childhood by Joseph Dunne, and one on
misguided economic conceptualizations of development by Randall Nielsen and Janice
Kinghorn. A few of the essays are reprinted from earlier publications, but most were
written for this volume. Virtually all the authors in this first volume ! the one
positioned to influence “the conversation” ! are academics. This presupposes that
academics are well positioned to renew the conversation. The editors of this volume,
Coulter and Wiens, certainly do not intend to be elitist. They begin their introduction by
describing the admirable accounts of educational ends provided by ordinary people,
and one of their editorial aims is to “expand the conversation” such that we all listen
more to ordinary people’s thoughts about education. But the structure of the two
volumes nonetheless assumes that academics have insights ! instantiated in the first
volume’s essays ! that can renew and enrich the conversation. As Smylie suggests in
his prologue to the second volume, academics can catalyze the “more fundamental
conversation” that we need (VC, 7). A reader might conclude that the editors’
prescription is for policymakers, practitioners, and the public to begin conversing more
like philosophers of education, thinking “about the perennial questions surrounding the
nature of the good life” (Ken Osborne, RC, 37). This would assume a hierarchical
relation between philosophy of education and educational policymakers, practitioners,
and the public, with knowledge moving downstream from academics to educational
publics. This is in some respects what the editors propose, but their vision turns out to
be more complex.
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We should be able to infer what the editors believe a renewed and enriched
conversation would entail by attending to the essays themselves. The first volume can
presumably renew the conversation because the authors say or do something that could
positively influence policymakers, practitioners, and the public. One way it might do
this is through the structure of the volume itself. Perhaps the volume exemplifies
something about how the renewed conversation should go, with different sections
representing different phases of the imagined conversation or covering key topics that
must be engaged in a productive conversation. Neither the structure nor the content of
the first volume reflects such an overarching account, however. In some ways the first
few essays are a bit broader, and the last few divide up the life stages of childhood,
adolescence, and adulthood. The largest section of essays covers a diverse set of topics in
this order: culture, imagination, science, math, spirituality, economics, the body,
indigenous perspectives, and technology. Most readers would probably appreciate a bit
more structure, but the editors’ approach is better than constraining such a complex
issue as the ends of education within one allegedly universal set of categories. With
respect to topic, then, “the conversation,” as the editors envision it, seems to be
heterogeneous.
The volume might also exemplify an ideal “conversation” at the level of
individual essays, if most essays contained some content or method that characterizes a
productive approach to the ends of education. But this is not the case either. Many of the
essays make interesting arguments, but only a few are systematic in a way that might
provide a model for scholarly conversation. Four of the essays across the two volumes
do offer taxonomies that might help to organize our thinking about the ends of
education. In the first of these, Brighouse argues that education should help people “to
lead flourishing lives in multiple dimensions” (RC, 59) and that a flourishing life often
involves the seven dimensions of money, family, work, friends/community, health,
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freedom, and values. In the second, Fenstermacher argues that most discussions of
educational ends focus on the reasonable but insufficient goals of academic achievement
and educational equity. He suggests that we should also educate for reasonableness,
agency, relationship, and morality. The third, Smylie’s prologue to the second volume,
divides the possible ends of education into the development of the individual, the
development of the society (economically or through increasing social justice), the
advancement of humanity, and the cultivation of democratic values and processes.
Finally, the fourth of these, Mike Rose’s contribution to the second volume, narrates
Rose’s own educational journey and describes several ends: broadening knowledge of
the world, providing a way to understand human behavior, offering a set of tools to
think with, providing skills to act in the world, offering the pleasure of competently
using knowledge, and having a sense of the self as capable. Each of these partly
overlapping taxonomies is plausible, and they might provide the beginnings of a more
systematic conceptualization of the ends of education. But the conversation as it stands
in the Yearbook leaves it to the reader to compare or integrate them.
There is one topic that recurs across most of the contributions: “democracy.” Of
the first nine substantive chapters in Renewing the Conversation, six are on democracy or
citizenship or both, and the editors say explicitly that democracy was a central editorial
concern. For example, Fenstermacher summarizes the goal of the volumes as
encouraging “a more expansive, robust and inclusive dialogue about education in
democratic societies” (RC, 2). Smylie singles out the cultivation of democratic values and
processes as one of the few basic ends of education (on the same level as developing the
individual and developing the society) “because we consider this … purpose so
important and so fundamental” (VC, 11). He also asserts that this heavy emphasis on
democracy reflects the “voice” of the two volumes: “This is a time when we need to be
particularly mindful of the very important relationship between education and
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democratic ideals and processes” (VC, 11). In their conclusion to the first volume, Wiens
and Coulter even claim that “democracy and education can be considered as two sides
of the same coin” (RC, 298). People in nondemocratic societies educate, however, so it
seems that the ends of education do not necessarily include democratic ideals and
processes ! unless education in nondemocratic societies cannot reasonably be called
“education,” or unless democracy is an end toward which educational processes
naturally tend. Acts targeted to participation in the political system are also a small
fraction of what people do in their lives, so it does not seem that a political system in the
narrow sense can be integral to all core educational ideals and processes. The editors’
enthusiasm for democracy seems to envision it as something broader than a mere
political system, as a process of sociality that is perhaps central to all societies. “The
conversation,” then, should be democratic, but it is not fully clear what the editors mean
by this.
What should a “renewed” conversation about education look like? And what
role should philosophers of education play in it ! should they lead it, or are they on
equal footing with everyone else? We can gain insight into these issues by examining
projected interlocutors’ tacit positioning. Like all language use, the Yearbook essays
identify authors and readers as recognizable types of social actors. The chapters
presuppose several types of interlocutory roles, and these represent various visions of
what a renewed conversation should look like. A few of the essays in the first volume
presuppose two didactic, opposed interlocutory roles. Ravitch, for instance,
distinguishes between education that forms students to fit society and education that
empowers individuals to direct themselves ! casting aspersions on the former and
defending the latter. One might object to her substantive argument, but I am not doing
so here. I focus on the interactional positions projected by her essay. She presupposes
two camps, one associated with each of the positions she identifies. She is in one camp,
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and less admirable others are in the other camp. Her essay thus presupposes a familiar
type of interaction: two antagonists, each perhaps hoping to convince the other of his or
her point of view but prepared to oppose the other if necessary. This resembles the
interactional format enacted on contemporary political talk shows, in which “balance”
means having one representative from each partisan camp and a series of didactic
expositions articulating opposed views. A few other essays in the volume project similar
oppositions. Ken Osborne distinguishes between “schooling” and “education,” decrying
the former and championing the latter. Ian Winchester makes a distinction between the
lawlike regularities of science and the hermeneutic richness of individual experience,
though he does not aim to replace one with the other. Most of the essays in the second
volume, perhaps because of their shortness, also presuppose this sort of interaction !
taking a relatively predictable position, or raising a familiar dichotomy and criticizing
the other side; nonetheless, many of these contributions tell interesting stories and are
engaging to read. It is useful to hear about education from a broad range of well-known
figures, ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, Bill Cosby, Ann
Landers, Bill Gates, Geoffrey Canada, Laura Bush, Vivian Paley, Colin Powell,
Christiane Amanpour, David Brooks, Eleanor Roosevelt, the John Birch Society, and
many others.
Taking and defending a clear position opposed to others’ can lead to useful
conversation in some cases. The editors do not seem to favor this vision of an ideal
“renewed conversation,” however. Wiens and Coulter say in their conclusion to the first
volume that the authors offer their arguments “tentatively” and with “courageous
humility.” In fact this describes only some of the essays, but it shows the editors’ belief
that a productive conversation about educational ends should not be primarily didactic.
And most essays in the first volume presuppose a different type of relation among
interlocutors. Appiah, for instance, refuses to choose between universalism and
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particularism. He argues that we must simultaneously keep in view both our common
humanity and our fundamental differences. He also refuses to choose between the need
for action and the power of reflection, arguing that the challenge of ethically living
together with others requires both material acts and conceptual reflection. The
interlocutory roles projected in Appiah’s argument are not opposed didactic positions.
Instead, those drawn to universalist or particularlist, idealist or materialist views are
asked to consider how apparently contradictory positions can each be true in some
respects. Appiah does not immediately invite interlocutors to take his side or oppose
him. He asks them to reconsider the assumptions they have habitually made and to join
him in exploring the tensions and potential elaborations that might allow them to
reconcile competing but powerful intuitions. He takes a position, but only after a more
complex process of examining assumptions and exploring alternatives.
Dunne adopts a similar approach in his essay, exploring divergent conceptions
of childhood: the “privative,” which presents children as lacking mature capacities, and
the “privileged,” which presents children as having unique capacities that they
(unfortunately) lose as they develop. Dunne does not fully accept or reject either of these
positions, but instead locates them sociohistorically and explores how aspects of each
might be layered into a view that could advance contemporary thinking about
education. Benhabib, in a well-known piece on the headscarf controversy in France,
moves beyond the two typical reactions to the controversy: that the state was oppressing
Muslim girls by unjustly preventing them from exercising their minority beliefs when it
banned headscarves, or that the state was liberating the girls by allowing them to move
beyond their patriarchal home culture. She shows how girls used the freedom of
expression fostered by the French state to embrace a traditional symbol and thus
articulated their own voice ! one that was distinct from their “traditional” societies (in
which women would not have been able to speak for themselves in public like this) but
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one that was also distinct from mainstream French culture (which avoids the mixing of
political voice and religious belief).
Other essays in the first volume also project interactions in which interlocutors
work together to uncover hidden assumptions in widely held positions and to explore
alternatives. Noddings argues, for example, that spirituality should not be avoided as an
educational topic and explores how formal education could include critical reflection on
this crucial dimension of human experience. Nussbaum rejects essentializing versions of
identity politics and describes how we might educate “world citizens” who empathize
with but do not reify “others.” Nielsen and Kinghorn show how economic
“development,” as a model for state-to-state relations between the North and South, fails
to account for how economic and educational processes are embedded within culturally
specific social and political relations. These essays all project a conversation in which
authors work with interlocutors to examine implausible assumptions that lie behind
familiar points of view and to explore alternatives that might be more productive.
I argue that this type of interactional organization captures something important
about “the conversation” as the editors imagine it. The authors who write this way
project a privileged status for themselves, because they are the ones able to uncover
others’ tacit (and sometimes invalid) assumptions and they are the ones able to model a
more incisive examination of assumptions and a more productive search for alternatives.
But the authors are not didactic, and they do not adopt an omniscient voice in which
they are able to foresee all relevant alternatives. Instead, after pointing out the
shortcomings of common assumptions, most authors invite readers into a conversation
about alternatives. These projected interactional roles remind me of the Socratic
elenchus in the early Platonic dialogues, in which Socrates first showed interlocutors the
implausibility of their habitual answers to important questions and then explored
alternative accounts with them. These Socratic conversations are not nihilist ! Socrates
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and most interlocutors assumed that we share standards and therefore are able to judge
some arguments as better than others ! but they are aporetic and thus presuppose that
ongoing conversation is required to address fundamental questions. The Socratic
elenchus captures the interactional roles presupposed in the majority of the essays:
academics have the capacity and the responsibility to show people how their taken-forgranted assumptions about educational ends have some undesirable consequences, and
academics should help guide open-ended conversations about these and alternative
approaches to fundamental educational questions, but people must engage in the
conversations themselves and cannot simply be told what to believe.
In at least one crucial respect, then, the Yearbook is compatible with the Handbook:
both presuppose that philosophers have some expert knowledge that will allow them to
formulate better arguments that might enrich public conversations about education. The
Yearbook aims to apply such knowledge, however, not to foster disciplinary research.
And the Yearbook suggests that educational publics will make crucial contributions to the
resulting conversations. Philosophers may catalyze or midwife these contributions, at
least in some cases, but educational researchers, policymakers, and practitioners, as well
as citizens will provide essential content. Thus the Yearbook turns both inward and
outward, drawing on philosophy but using it for a conversation that extends beyond the
discipline.
Heterogeneous Stances in the Philosophy of Education
First impressions of the Handbook and the Yearbook are partly misleading. The
Handbook does not merely represent an elitist vision in which knowledge flows
downstream from general philosophers to philosophers of education, and thence
perhaps to educational publics. It does turn inward toward the discipline, and many
chapters in the Handbook show how philosophers of education could productively draw
on general philosophers’ arguments and enlist them to help address educational
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questions. This could surely help philosophers of education do substantive work that
might contribute to policy and practice. But the Handbook also argues that general
philosophers sometimes need to engage with educational issues in order to do the core
work of the discipline, and this leaves open the possibility that general philosophers
might even engage with educational research, policy, and practice as another way of
enriching their thought. On the other side, the Yearbook does not simply represent a
populist vision in which philosophers help articulate the wisdom of the masses by
participating in the public’s ongoing conversation about education. It does turn outward
toward educational publics, illustrating how philosophers could productively engage
with public conversations about education and showing how ongoing public
conversations already include many provocative ideas and some interesting arguments
about the ends of education. But the first volume of the Yearbook also presupposes that
philosophers have expertise that can help clarify and deepen public conversations. This
is compatible with the Handbook’s vision in some ways, as professional philosophers will
provide some expert knowledge and practices that can catalyze “the conversation.”
The two projects differ significantly in spirit, however. The Handbook’s turn
toward the discipline yields more compelling arguments, but it usually presupposes that
knowledge flows downstream from philosophers to educational publics. For both of
these reasons (rigor and elitism), some who like the Handbook will not like the Yearbook,
and vice versa. It is nonetheless useful to read these projects together because the hybrid
positions sketched in the preceding paragraph might be combined into a broader vision
for philosophy of education. On such a view, knowledge does not simply flow
downstream from academic experts to educational publics because even general
philosophers can learn new things about their core interests from engaging with
educational processes and educational practices. Philosophers have some superior
knowledge and skills that could improve public theories and practices. Publics also have

!

#+!

the right and some relevant knowledge to participate in conversations about educational
means and ends, but they could use expert help sometimes. This would seem to position
philosophy of education as a broker, contributing to disciplinary knowledge but also
facilitating engagement between disciplinary ideas and relevant publics.
I argue that we should do that in various ways. Philosophers of education should
not have only one stance in their role at the intersection of disciplinary philosophy and
educational research, policy, and practice. Sometimes colleagues and publics respond
well to a didactic stance, in which a philosopher articulates and defends a position
opposed to commonly held views. Philosophers of education can do this by, for
example, exposing the assumptions about knowledge contained in educational
“standards” and arguing for an alternative view of human flourishing. Sometimes
colleagues and publics benefit from Socratic questioning, from having an interlocutor
expose their faulty assumptions and work with them toward more plausible answers to
complex educational questions. Philosophers of education can do this by, for example,
showing people both the benefits and the limits of decontextualized knowledge and
exploring the question of how knowledge, reasoning skills, and cognitive dispositions
are all required for full cognitive functioning. Bakhtinian polyphony provides a third
alternative. Mikhail Bakhtin described how novelists such as Fyodor Dostoevsky
struggle not to take a final position and encourage multiple voices to engage in
unfinalizable dialogue. Interlocutors espousing a Rabelaisian philosophy revel in
multiplicity and heterogeneity, deliberately flouting convention and eschewing closure.
The Handbook and the Yearbook do not contain many examples of such an approach, but
we certainly have colleagues who revel in the incompleteness of all complex arguments.
Philosophers of education could be Bakhtinian, trying to keep alive multiple voices on
essentially contestable educational issues and fostering engagement among
contradictory positions. Jürgen Habermas offers a fourth alternative with his more
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sober, rationalistic ideal speech situation in which people aim for consensus. This, too,
has its place, and educators could help create spaces in which stakeholders have the
opportunity to examine the merits of each other’s arguments and to work toward a
mutually acceptable view of issues. I have my personal favorites among these four
stances, but I believe that philosophers of education could productively adopt each of
them in different circumstances. Depending on the stance we choose, we will use
different tools from our philosophical repertoires, and we will position ourselves
differently with respect to the discipline and with respect to educational publics.
Philosophers of education could also productively engage in various ways with
fields beyond philosophy. We could (and some already do) usefully engage with
scientific research ! not just to analyze it philosophically, but to take on the role of a
scientist and accept some scientific conclusions, grafting a scientific disposition onto a
philosophical one. Such a stance could allow philosophers to make and examine
educational claims in productive ways. In his Handbook chapter, D.C. Phillips argues
convincingly that both general philosophers and philosophers of education should be
more familiar with empirical research in education because philosophical arguments
about educational questions sometimes depend on empirical claims. If philosophers and
researchers paid more attention to each other’s work, researchers would “think about
their work with greater clarity and [philosophers would] be led down interesting
philosophical paths” (Phillips in OPE, 402). As another alternative, philosophers of
education could (and some already do) work to solve problems of educational practice
or policy, perhaps partnering with practitioners and contributing philosophical skills to
solve educational problems or to seize educational opportunities in schools and
communities. Engagement with practice or policy, in a situation where concrete actions
must be taken, often forces an academic to reflect on familiar ideas in new ways. I would
not want philosophers simply to become practitioners, such that they lose their
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distinctive knowledge and skills, but doing practical work and relating the experiences
to one’s philosophy can enrich both. As a third alternative, philosophers of education
might (and some already do) communicate philosophy through contemporary electronic
media. One essay in Voices from the Conversation, by the Liberal Democrats Online Policy
Consultation Group, includes online responses posted on a website. Might blogs, wikis,
tweets, samples, and other forms of online publication and social networking facilitate
conversation about education? Could alternative modes of representation ! such as
film, for example ! open up new possibilities for academic work? Given the divergent
affordances of these media, we cannot simply transfer academic conversation into them.
It might nonetheless be useful to deploy some philosophical resources in communication
genres other than traditional philosophical ones.
These different stances ! didactic, Socratic, Bakhtinian, Habermasian, and
engagement in empirical research, educational practice, or alternative media ! are of
course heterogeneous, and various combinations and alternatives are possible. But they
cannot all be reduced to one type of stance or one type of activity, and I argue that we
should not try to pick one best stance for all philosophers of education. Different
philosophers should position themselves differently, and individual philosophers
should adopt different stances at different times. Sometimes knowledge and skills can
usefully flow downstream to educational researchers, practitioners, and policymakers,
through didactic or Socratic interventions, for example. Philosophers have made
distinctions, reframed questions, and posed alternatives that have been and could be
useful for more applied fields, and philosophers of education can productively deploy
these resources or communicate useful results downstream. But resources can
productively move upstream as well. As Cuypers and Kitcher argue in their Handbook
chapters, core problems in general philosophy sometimes require reflection on
educational questions. Philosophers of education tend to engage with both philosophical
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and practical questions, and they might be useful brokers for engaging philosophy more
deeply with practice. In general, then, philosophers’ knowledge and skills can be
productively deployed in various settings and various ways, and resources from other
domains of research and practice can sometimes be useful for doing philosophy. As a
field located on the boundary, philosophy of education has an opportunity to broker
such exchanges and to create useful hybrids. We may be marginal, but in cases where
boundary crossing is valued, marginality can be an asset. I suggest that we embrace
heterogeneity.
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